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One April morning in 1836 readers of The Monthly Magazine 
were treated to the first installment of what was to become a comic 
masterpiece, The Posthumous Pape:r>s of the Piakwiak Club, Containing 
a Faithful Reao:r>d of the Pe:r>ambulations, Perils, T:r>avels, Adventu:r>es 
and Sporting Transaations of the Co:r>:r>esponding Members. In this 
installment they were immediately transported to the center of the 
Club's activities with the unanimously approved resolution of grati-
tude to SAMUEL PICKWICK for his paper, "Speculations on the Source of 
the Hampstead Ponds, with some Observations on the Theory of Tittle-
bats." Deeply appreciative of the advantages accruing to the cause 
of science from the unwearied researches of Samuel Pickwick, the Club 
expressed an even stronger "sense of the inestimable benefits which 
must inevitably result from carrying the speculations of that learned 
man into a wider field ... the advancement of knowledge and the diffu-
sion of learning. 11 
Just as the preacher must have a text, so, I think, must an 
after-dinner speaker, however far he wanders from it. My primary 
title is of course derived from the grimmest tragedy by the most 
Doric of Greek dramatists, AESCHYLUS, The Seven Against Thebes--but 
there the connection ceases. Or does it? While some of you may not 
fear one of the most deadly of pollutions, misbegotten language, I do. 
Moreover, as an historian I have long been interested in the efforts 
of men, scientists prominent among them, over the centuries to 
combat that pollution, and alongside to diffuse learning rather than 
content themselves with taking in one another's intellectual 
washing, 
Had I time, knowledge, courage, and ability I might have 
attempted a dialogue between Darwin, Mendel, and Stadler. Or I 
might have sketched a genetic history of England, marvellously 
original, wherein I accounted, as never before, for the rise of the 
common law, the break with the Roman Church, the triumph of 
parliament, the rise, glory, decline and fall of the British Empire. 
Sillier things have been done, even by historians. No doubt the 
rise of the common law did owe something to t~e deficiencies, genetic 
among them, of kings, because although it was commonly recited that 
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the king could do no wrong a great deal of English history stands on 
the plain fact that he could do wrong and had frequently done so. No 
doubt something could be made of the fact that Henry VIII had such an 
itch for women (he was not unique) that he cheerfully rent the fabric 
of the Church (a fabric so easily rent must have been rotten). No 
doubt Charles I lost his head because he was a stupid liar; no doubt 
the course of empire, up and down, owed something to genes. And so 
one might conduct many post-mortems, though it would take more than 
a mere historian to provide helpful explanations. I shall then, as 
a mere historian, use this occasion to take inventory of a major, but 
inadequately explored, area in the history of science, the area of 
communication, concentrating upon two vital periods, the 17th and 
19th centuries, more particularly the latter, for although the two 
centuries do have some features in common, as I shall show, the 19th 
is closer in time, culture, and scientific interest . 
I could of course go back to Confucius who knew that when 
words are misused affairs go wrong and that a. gentleman is nowise 
careless of words, to Buddha who taught the need to get the story 
straight, and to the Book of Job wherein was asked, "should a wise 
man utter vain knowledge and fill his belly with the east wind, 
should he reason with unprofitable talk, or with speeches whereof he 
can do no good?" I could recall the 11th chapter of Genesis which 
relates how God did confound the language of all the earth and with 
what disastrous consequences; or Aristotle's identity of words and 
thought; or St. Paul's warning to the Corinthians, "except ye utter 
by the tongue words easy to be understood, how shall it be known what 
is spoken? ... for he that speaketh in an unknown tongue speaketh not 
unto men ... for no man understandeth him." But fear not that I shall 
lay a wreath on the altar of every man since Adam to address himself 
to this matter. 
Nonetheless, "that all may understand" has been a theme song 
in the history of science in England for half a millenium. In 1477 
THOMAS NORTON, '!'he Drdinall of Alchemy, defended his plain and common 
speech on the ground that he was speaking to 10,000 laymen rather 
than ten able clerks, immediately recalling St. Paul: "I bad rather 
speak five words with my understanding than 10,000 words in an 
unknown tongue." A century later, HUMPHRY GILBERT, in his projected 
Academy (1570) insisted that the professors must set down a record of 
their experiments "without equivocation or enigmatical phrases." 
Except ye utter words easy to be understood how shall it be known 
what is spoken? Twenty-five years later, Gresham College (1594) put 
that ideal into practice, with the insistence that the professors, 
five out of the original seven being scientifically trained, give 
their "solemn and public lectures" ·in English as well as Latin, "for 
that the greatest part of the inhabitants within the city understood 
not the Latin tongue." The contemporary urge for translations 
reflected the same temper: between 1475 and 1640, 900 men were 
translating foreign books--many of them scientific--into English, 
exclusive of 400 translated anonymously. Out of every eight books in 
English one was a translated book. 
For whom was this harvest gathered? The middling sort of 
people, literate in English. And why? Because they wanted to know. 
This appetite, owing so much to the discovery and ·invention of the 
strange world, new andold, beyond the seas, was manifest in museums, 
gardens, dictionaries, and compilations. It represented above all 
else the conviction that knowledge; like muck, was of no use until it 
was spread. As THOMAS DIGGES, who first popularized Copernicus 
(1580), confessed, though he could amplify his fame by publishing in 
Latin he would publish in English_for the benefit of the unlearned, 
the commonwealth, and even mankind, because England had diverse 
11mechanicians" ready to apply the latest knowledge. "To know why and 
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how," said HOBBES (1651) "is a lust of the mind that by perseverance 
of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge 
exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure," and, even more 
graphically, a generation later the witty MARQUIS of HALIFAX declared 
that "the struggling for knowledge hath a pleasure in it like that of 
wrestling with a fine woman." More relevantly, perhaps, BACON 
steadily and variously presumed the obligation to publish what was 
known for the benefit of men, an ideal adhered to throughout the 17th 
century. In 1662 the Royal Society was chartered for the improvement 
of man's estate, and as ROBERT HOOKE proposed, "The business and 
design of the Royal Society is to improve the knowledge of natural 
things and all useful arts." 
First of all, why were 17th century scientists and their 
allies--BOYLE, HOOKE, NEWTON, the mathematicians WARD, WILKINS, and 
WALLIS, BACON, HOBBES, and LOCKE, JOHN EVELYN, BISHOP SPRAT, and 
DRYDEN, to name but the best known--so concerned with communication? 
BOYLE himself supplied some informing clues. Although he would not 
go so far as to say that Ciceronian metaphors were crutches to weak 
or lame fancies, tricking up slight subjects with rich ornaments of 
language to cover barrenness of thought, he did pronounce them clogs 
to sound and active ones. Men should indeed use different styles 
for different subjects, but always preserve a certain dignity of 
expression, forbear soaring as well as avoid creeping. 
What stood back of those insights? Certainly a wide variety 
of stimuli, of which it will be sufficient to specify four, all 
revolutionary: the rise of the vernacular, geographical discovery, 
scientific advance, and the philosophical and theological conse-
quences of the latter two. For two centuries men had been attacking 
first the inadequacies of the vernacular, its poverty of terms and 
loose expression, then its extravagances--its metaphysical obscurity, 
quibbles, and labyrinths, entangled in cobwebs, its perversion of 
simplicity into the rubbish and rubble of affected analysis. In both 
campaigns, which are not to be separated, they pursued the ideals of 
clarity, precision, and conciseness: no ·word without a thing, no 
word without an idea. Away with bewitching metaphors and their fatal 
imposture, banish fascination with words that made them operate with 
a force beyond what was intended. Banish vicious abundance of 
phrases that swathed knowledge in so many mists, for which the only 
remedy was return to primitive purity, "when men delivered so many 
things almost in an equal number of words," a close naked, natural 
way of speaking. Properly, plainly, concisely, naturally. The new 
philosophy (science that is) must wear a fitting garb. The linguistic 
imperative: so write that the words will not mystify readers; so 
write as to answer the questions, what were you trying to say, what 
did you mean when you said what you did, was what you said true, did 
the words you used meah the same thing to you and your readers? 
The most specific and interesting response to these and 
related questions was a variety of projects for a universal language, 
the fruit of the ablest and most influential scientists of the day and 
lesser ones as well, one to which men had long been moving. Although 
NEWTON is the most famous of the projectors, his two interwoven 
schemes, derived in large part from other men's proposals, fall far 
short of the comprehensive, 660 page folio, Essay towards a ReaZ 
Charaater and a PhiZosophiaaZ Language (1668), by JOHN WILKINS, a 
founder and secretary of the Royal Society, whose thirty year pursuit 
of this will-o 1-the-wisp was limned in contemporary doggerel: 
A Doctor counted very able 
Designs that all mankind converse shall, 
Spite o' th' confusion made at Babel 
By character call'd universal. 
How long this character we'll be learning 
That truly passeth my discerning. 
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Although WILKINS' design came to nothing in itself, owing primarily 
to its complexity and, even more, to appreciation that language 
cannot be frozen, it did excite the approval of many scientists, 
notably BOYLE and HOOKE, who believed that it would exceedingly 
abbreviate the number of words, greatly reduce circumlocution, 
contribute to perspicuity and distinction, and promote elegancy and 
signification, though then and later there were those who regarded 
elegancy an enemy to signification. Among others who sought the same 
end--"mechanicians," merchants, clergy, virtuosi, even schoolmasters 
and astrologers--the most interesting, to you especially, was WILLIAM 
PETTY with a project, owing much to exploration and discovery, and to 
the efforts of a Silesian schoolmaster, KINNER, to provide a botanical 
real character, which some believed might be extended to other areas 
of thought . 
This project immediately suggests a second influence on the 
scientific campaign for clarity and communication, one quickly 
summarized, namely the contraction of the world, even the universe. 
Once men had learned about Africa and China and once they had 
accepted KEPLER they put no limits to their own capacities : the 
kingdom of man was installed. If men could go to Peking they could 
go to the moon--and WILKINS had no doubt about that--and wherever 
they went they faced the need to be intelligible. They also . faced 
the necessity of coping with new genera and species (WILKINS had 
called upon JOHN RAY, who, however, when he saw WILKINS' essay thought 
it "ridiculous."); the Oxford Physic Garden, founded in 1632, by 1650 
had 1,000 foreign exotics and 600 native species, both being "daily 
augme11ted." Other areas of scientific change presented the same 
problems of terminology- and c lassification. 
In the face of scientific discoveries many men, believing all 
coherence gone, were quick to charge atheism and materialism, the 
more that political and religious controversy, marked by ranting and 
canting, threatened to destroy the world they knew. To rebut their 
charges technical formulas were not enough. Scientists must harmonize 
their hypotheses with conventional belief, write philosophy as well 
as science. NEWTON's theological works were not eccentricity or 
senility but the compulsion to promote harmony. He and his fellows 
sought not to attack the,glogy but to rationalize it. They had to find 
order, design, meaning . They recognized their obligation to be 
intelligible, to inform and instruct, even to entertain. In this 
role, despite the aforesaid charges, they were luckier than their 19th 
century successors; they lived in a homogeneous society wherein men 
of diverse pursuits could talk to one another. Presuming communica-
tion they could also presume receptivity . 
I I 
In the 19th century transformation in science intersected with 
the rise of the first industrial society of which many facets were 
none other than applied science. Nowhere was the total situation 
better put than by two major periodicals, BZaakwoods and Edinburgh, 
at mid-century . The extension of knowledge, art of printing, growth 
of literacy, traveling made everything go at a gallop. A single 
year brought its fruits to maturity in the intellectual as in the 
physical world. Changes so vast and rapid struck the least imagina-
tive minds with an anxious sense of instability and filled the most 
imaginative with dim visions of a future that no theorems of the 
schools and the churches would or could contain. Such a diagnosis, 
long in the making, bespoke an age of anxiety, chiefly manifest for 
present purposes in the warfare of science and theology. No wonder 
that scientists in every field were engaged among other pursuits in 
educating the public. They would improve the medium in order to 
convey the message; they avoided jargon first to interest, then to 
convince their readers. To envisage the situation one can profitably 
look closely at some major figures, though before doing so a quick 
assessment of the scientific environment will be beneficial. 
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When the Royal Society ceased either to advance knowledge or 
improve man's estate new societies filled the var:,mm. In 1799 the 
Royal Institution "for diffusing knowledge and facilitating the 
introduction of useful mechanical inventions and improvements for 
teaching by .courses of philosophical lectures and experiments the 
application of science to the common purposes of life" came into 
being. Three years later, 1802, HUMPHRY DAVY, professor of chemistry, 
insisted that "the man who has been accustomed to study natural 
objects philosophically, to be perpetually guarding against the 
delusions of fancy, will not readily be induced to multiply words so 
as to forget things." Within a few years several specialized societies 
and in 1831 the British Association for the Advancement of Science 
attested the persistence of the same objectives voiced long before by 
the Royal Society and more recently by the Royal Institution. The 
Association was intended to give "a stronger impulse and more system-
atic direction to scientific inquiry, to obtain a greater degree of 
national attention to the objects of science and a removal of those 
disadvantages which impede its progress, and to promote the inter-
course of the cultivators of science with one another, and with 
foreign philosophers." Science actually needed promotion less than 
coordination. Journals and societies were evidence not only of 
popularity and popularization but of fragmentation and the need for 
relationships so that the discoveries of one man could benefit others. 
Above all, the Association would join writers and readers, professors 
and students. The presidential address then became, in the words of 
Sir JOSEPH HOOKER, "a scientific tour de force, philosophical and 
popular, or a resume of one or more important branches of science." 
Meanwhile, though the advancement of science may have been 
light it was not all sweetness. Several critics, varied in scientific 
interests and attainment~ bitterly attacked the Royal Society for its 
futility and mediocrity, "science without a head". Ability to afford 
the fee not scientific achievement determined membership. Yet the 
critics themselves were somewhat ambivalent; they would advance pure 
science and at the same time apply its discoveries; as with the 
object of their denunciation utility was a major objective. In 
addition to bitterness there was fun, as satire, that ever rich 
historical source, entered the lists without deference to any : 
DICKENS deriding the British Association; THOMAS L. PEACOCK mocking 
the Society for the Diffusion of Useful KNowledge (the Steam Intellect 
Society) and the Social Science Association (the Pantopragmatic or 
Science of Verbiage Society) where conjectures were erected into 
dogmas, and above all lampooning their major prophet LORD BROUGHAM 
(Mr. Facing-both-Ways), "master of those who pretend to know" who 
could make a speech of seven hours' duration and this would be its 
quintessence, that, seeing the difficulty of putting salt on the 
bird's tail, it would be expedient to consider the best method of 
throwing dust in the bird's eyes; and finally, later on, LEWIS CARROLL 
puncturing Jabberwocky and Humpty Dumpty's claim that he could make a 
word mean "just what I choose it to mean--neither more nor less." 
In this atmosphere and that of discoveries meaningful to men,. 
men in society rather than men in the solar system, the need for 
communication, that all may understand, increased. Several distin-
guished scientists sought to meet that need--MICHAEL FARADAY (1791-
1867), WILLIAM WHEWELL (1794-1866), CHARLES LYELL (1797-1875), 
CHARLES DARWIN (1809-82), FRANCIS GALTON (1822-1911), THOMAS HUXLEY 
(1825-95), and KARL PEARSON (1857-1936). Since their education helps 
to explain their character it warrants a few sentences. FARADAY, son 
of a blacksmith, had no formal education at all; after apprenticeship 
to a bookbinder he became in 1813 HUMPHRY DAVY's assistant at Royal 
Institution where he remained the rest of his life. WHEWELL, in 
striking contrast, specialized in mathematics as a Cambridge student, 
became mathematical lecturer at Trinity, shifted to mineralogy, of 
which he became professor briefly. Soon he was active in the British 
Association and deep in the History of the Inductive Sciences (3 
vols.l 1837), the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (2 vols., 1840~ 
In 18'11 this "ruddy, strapping divine" became Master of Trinity, 
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having already become professor of moral philosophy. Thereafter he 
promoted university reform, wrote several fugitive essays on science, 
and concluded his career with six lectures on political economy. In 
no capacity was he trivial. CHARLES LYELL studied and practiced law 
before turning to geology. When he did so he traveled extensively, 
including two trips to the U.S., of which the journals provide an 
extraordinarily valuable commentary on the American scene. Indeed 
travel was · a major ingredient in the training of DARWIN, briefly 
geologist, and of GALTON and HUXLEY, both of whom had medical training 
as well. The men I have specified realized from their experiences 
that to convince they must first communicate. 
Though less likely than several to ring a bell .in your memory 
WHEWELL warrants first attention because he was most aware of that 
necessity, because he directly influenced FARADAY and LYELL, and 
because he was acutely conscious not only of nature but of nature's 
God and all His followers. In this context the Bridgewater Treatises, 
1833-40, warrant mention, not ~or themselves but for their purpose, 
They took their name from the £8000 bequest by the Earl of Bridge-
water (d. 1829), clergyman and president of the Royal Society, an 
heir to the canal duke, which was divided among eight lecturers who 
published treatises on the "power, wisdom, and goodness of God, as 
manifested in the Creation. 11 These treatises registered the desire 
to reconcile orthodox Christianity and science and the perplexity of 
those who questioned Creationism but were not prepared to accept 
evolutionism. WHEWELL' s contribution of a lecture, 11 Astronomy and 
General Physics Considered with Reference to Natural Theology," is 
no cause for surprise. Early in his career he mastered the analytical 
methods that were revolutionizing mathematics and though he soon 
denigrated such analysis he nevertheless approached problems 
analytically and for all his specialized interests was fully sensi-
tive to changes in society as well as knowledge. Throughout he 
repeatedly and insistently stressed the interpendence of nomenclature 
and the advancement of learning. Since men were morally and 
intellectually bound to get their message straight they were obli-
gated to strip the medium of ambiguity and emotion. 
Language, the instrument of thought, was also its nutriment. 
Every step toward exact knowledge was marked by a technical term 
since common language often like common knowledge suffered from 
ambiguity and indistinctness. When knowledge becomes exact language 
must also be exact; each term must convey a meaning steadily fixed 
and rigorously limited. "Loose and infantine" terms could not "hold 
objects steadily enough for scientific examination, or lift them from 
one stage of generalization to another. 11 Yet although WHEWELL found 
in popular scientific writing many examples of inaccuracy arising 
from the appropriation of common terms, he preferred old terms 
wherever possible because readers would not take the trouble to learn 
the meaning of new ones unless they were assisted by some obvious 
suggestion connected with common usage. Therefore he emphasized the 
need, in appropriating common words as technical terms, to retain the 
common meaning. On the other hand since a new word was freer of 
ambiguity it was to be preferred in cases where common words caused 
inconvenience. New ones of course must have a use, and that use 
consisted not in neatness or ingenuity but in communication. The 
vehicle was commended by the value it conveyed. 
These objectives marked WHEWELL's essay on the transformation 
of hypotheses in the history of science (1851) where he recognized 
that men clung to familiar words even as they modified the idea of 
which the words were the symbols; and in the Philosophy of Disaove~y 
(1860) wherein he applauded LOCKE and the French sensationalists for 
stressing that the office of language was not only to convey and 
preserve thoughts but to perform the analysis in which reasoning 
consists. The selection of a technical term was essential to dis-
covery, and realization of this was the most considerable addition 
to the philosophy of science since Bacon. Finally in his lectures 
on political economy (1862) he insisted that definition must precede 
propositions. 
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To move from WHEWELL to FARADAY is to move into area demanding 
far more sophistication than mineralogy or geology, one necessitating 
greater mastery of style in order to interest, yet one less likely 
to flutter the theological dovecotes. For that matter, FARADAY, a 
man of simple faith, is inconceivable in such a role, for he never 
doubted that he was proving God's omnipotence. Perhaps because of 
this, by practice and precept he devoted himself to the ideal of 
communication. On the advice of WHEWELL he introduced a new term-
inology, one exemplifying his conviction that "the student should be 
continually engaged in forming exact ideas, and in expressing them 
clearly .... Such practice insensibly opposes any tendency to 
exaggeration and mistakes." The student must recruit words that at 
once satisfy the laboratory and inform the public. Because science 
would alter the condition of the working class that class should 
know about science; 'that knowledge they could only acquire through 
intelligible exposition by scientists. Mankind should not be put 
off by novelty so long as the meaning was understood. To illustrate 
his objective FARADAY lectured at the Royal Institution for 38 years, 
never more successfully than "On the Chemical History of a Candle .. " 
Nevertheless by 1857 he began to appreciate that the ideal he 
never surrendered might be reaching the end of its tether. In that 
year he inquired of CLERK-MAXWELL, may not the conclusions of a 
mathematician investigating physical science "be expressed in common 
language as fully, clearly, and definitely as in mathematical formulae? 
If so, would it not be a great boon to such as we to express them so--
translating them out of their hieroglyphics so that we also might 
work upon them by experiment ... Would it not be a good thing, if 
mathematicians, writing on these subjects, were to give us their 
results in this popular working state as well as that which is their 
own and proper to them?" Thirteen years later, 1870, MAXWELL, fully 
aware of the problem, allowed that "scientific truth should be pre-
sented in different forms and should be regarded as equally scientific 
whether it appears in a robust form in the vivid coloring of a physi-
cal illustration, or in the tenuity and paleness of a symbolical 
expression," i.e. words. His confession, however, falls a little 
sadly, because whatever the virtue of equality the task of implement-
ing it was insurmoutable. 
Earlier in time, simpler in matter, CHARLES LYELL resolved 
semantic hazards to his own satisfaction. Whether or not WHEWELL, 
who advised him on terminology, influenced his inclusion of a 
chapter, "Origin and Development of Languages and Species Compared," 
in Phe GeoZogiaai Evidenae of the Antiquity of Man (1863) I do not 
know. Even though LYELL's theories now command no support the 
chapter deserves a look as evidence not only of his sensitivity to a 
problem but of Victorian linguistic opinion. Emphasizing the rapidity 
of change in language--manifest in a generation and in such forms as 
accents, slang, technology, idioms, and professions--he drew analogies 
with biology and geology. Why did some word forms survive and others 
disappear? Social factors, class dominance, superstitions, veneration 
(Jesus spoke English), LYELL also emphasized the relation of ideas to 
verbalization: progressive improvement in language was a necessary 
consequence II would say preZude] of the progress of the human mind 
from one generation to another; as civilization advanced more terms 
were required to express abstract ideas, and words previously used in 
a.vague sense gradually acquired more precise meaning, in consequence 
of which several terms must be employed to express what earlier a 
single word had signified, however loosely and imperfectly. Although 
LYELL recognized that the origin of a language was a mystery he 
appreciated that speech had many carpenters"--"savage and sage, 
peasant and man of letters, the child and the philosopher"--all of 
whom had through many generations built the fabric, the instrument of 
thought, Here indeed in the preais of a long chapter in the history 
of civilization; here is recognition that man is compounded of the 
language he speaks and the concepts that language conveys. 
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No wonder then that LYELL from the beginning, defined his 
terms and their context with great economy of exposition: "Geology 
is the science which investigates the successive changes that have 
taken place in the organic and inorganic kingdoms of nature; it 
inquires into the causes of these changes and the influence which 
they have exerted in modifying the surface and external structure of 
our planet." With DARWIN after him he stressed "gradual transforma~ 
tion," yet warned that the "tide of observation advances with such 
speed that improvements in theory outrun the changes in nomenclature; 
and the attempt to inculcate new truths by words invented to express 
a different or opposite opinion, tends constantly, by the force of 
association, to perpetuate error; so that dogmas renounced by the 
reason still retain a strong hold upon the imagination." (1851) 
When compelled to invent new terms LYELL defined them carefully in a 
glossary, appreciating that these in turn, by suggesting relation-
ships and process, contributed to discoveries and new theories. Here 
he was following the path struck out by LAVOISIER (1789): since 
"ideas are preserved and communicated by means of words it necessarily 
follows that we cannot improve the language of science without at the 
same time improving the science itself." Conversely, let us say, we 
cannot improve the science without improving its language, nor can we 
debase the language without destroying the science. That LYELL ful-
filled a need is attested by the numerous printings of his works, 
though to make the point is not to deny suspicion and hostility, 
among fellow geologists as well as the public. 
In this respect he was to be sure, compared to DARWIN, a pale 
rider on a pale horse: rocks were one thing, apes another. Perhaps 
because he recognized this, DARWIN was supremely conscientious in what 
he wrote, and so, as HUXLEY said, "delivered a thought-reversing 
doctrine to mankind with as little disturbance as possible of the 
deeply-rooted sentiments of the age." He began his argument by 
asking if his hypothesis was provable. After all he was addressing a 
public that for the most part believed that the world and all that 
therein was had been created by an all wise Designer, yet at the same 
time contained many men who even as they postulated creation recog-
nized mutation. He was nonetheless attacking two citadels, one 
theological, the other scientific, and in doing so he faced a problem 
in personal logistics: how to be intelligible without being trivial, 
how to convey his vision without destroying it. 
So impressive was his argument--repetitious but never tedious--
that even his fellow scientists applauded his "masterly" explanation 
perhaps even more than the hypothesis. Over and over he emphasized 
that selection brought about evolution by choosing variations in a 
particular direction over a long period during which a "steady 
accumulation" with "slight modification" occurred. Choosing familiar 
examples he advanced propositions, propositions that men must spon-
taneously accept, namely, for instance, that no two pigeons were 
exactly alike in coloring, size, beak. If any reader had not appre-
ciated this we may be sure that he went immediately to look. If 
pigeons varied, so did dogs, roses. Everything in this world varied, 
and indeed the whole world varied--the sea wearing away the rocks, 
changes in the terrain. Here DARWIN benefited from the contemporary 
appetite for archeology. How many parsons, squires, doctors, lawyers 
were digging up pots and shards and describing their finds at monthly 
meetings cannot be ·calculated. The reports may have been naive but 
the interest produced an empathy conducive to acceptance of his 
theory. Again and again he emphasized differences between what men 
saw, variations in plants and animals under domestication, variations 
observed by his readers, variations induced by breeding. And then he 
slipped in a clinching argument, almost as if in absence of mind. He 
pointed to the struggle for survival and the common sense fact that 
survivors mate. Always he chose the homely connection: red clover 
flourished when bumble bees were most plentiful; they were most 
plentiful when mice were scarce; mice were scarce when cats were 
active. From clover to cats and back again. Obviously DARWIN was a 
superb natural selector, and when he has finished his argument one 
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understands how he reversed human thought with so few fireworks. The 
latter exp l oded to be sure but they were set off to a considerable 
degree by his bulldog. 
Although it is too much to say no DARWIN, no HUXLEY, or, if 
you will, no HUXLEY, no DARWIN, the two are in the popular mind 
inseparable. Indeed in the context of my present remarks HUXLEY 
springs quicker to mind than DARWIN, but I regard the bulldog as less 
important than the spaniel. To hail the latter is not to denigrate 
the former. THOMAS HUXLEY, prince of lecturers, clearly presumed that 
though his sins might be scarlet he would be read, and he was, despite 
his grandson's opinion that his vocabulary was his weakest point, 
being in no way exquisite. No, it was not exquisite, neither was it 
weak (though this is not what Aldous meant). Rather considering both 
his intent to be read and the circumambient hostility to the Origin 
his militant vocabulary is predictable- -storm, battle, tension, 
strategy, conquer. "The modern world is fu l l of artillery and we 
turn out our children to do battle in it equipped with the shie l d and 
sword of an ancient gladiator." "Get your audience or be a cipher." 
To secure this latter schools should teach English composition and 
incul cate the virtues of the greatest English stylists, for he 
thought that DARWIN, for all his "marvellous dumb sagacity," would 
have been even more effective had he been better educated in composi-
tion. He equated HOBBES with dignity, DEFOE with simplicity, SWIFT 
with conciseness and clarity, all necessary in scientific writing . 
He warned against sham and cant, and distinguished between true 
eloquence and slipshod copiousness. Rating precision high he main-
tained that II clear knowledge of what one does not know is just as 
important as knowing what one does know." Vivid and concrete in all 
his illustrations he matched FARADAY's capacity to get across to a 
popular audience. No wonder that he thought that the Germans had no 
sense of style; they seemed to compose their books with a pitchfork . 
He surely would have sympathized with the belief that life was too 
short to learn German an d that it was ·the German destiny to make 
everything difficult. 
Far less pugilistic but no less concerned with educating the 
public was DARWIN's cousin, precocious FRANCIS GALTON. How far his 
convictions reflected the temper of his mind and how far the apostle-
ship of eugenics --a word he coined--and biometrics, need not be 
debated here. Recognizing eugenics as a subject "particularly attrac-
t i ve to cranks," he proclaimed the need for making it familiar and 
understandable, a conviction grounded in his presumptions that its 
tenets should be taken as seriously as religion (the evangelical 
conscience-- and vocabulary--is the key to so much English history) and 
that neither democracy nor empire could withstand degenerate stock. 
To label him "racist" is easy--and evidence that few men can survive 
their disciples. 
Whatever the springs of his conviction he deplored the low 
standard of scientific literature: a slovenly essay was as shameful 
as slovenly dress. It wasted the reader's time in trying to under-
stand what ought to be simple, vivid, logical. Because he thought 
the English language a powerful weapon in which much more could be 
expressed briefly than was generally attempted GALTON would minimize 
the use of technical words, especially since a technical word did not 
quickly acquire the exact meaning it was intended to convey. He 
knew how difficult it was to put thoughts into accurate speech and 
how from the earliest times words had conveyed false impressions on 
the simplest matters, not least because of the "curious and abiding 
fantasy" of certain persons to translate words into pictures, some-
times vivid and permanent. For that reason, among others, he main-
tained that until .the phenomena of any branch of knowledge had been 
submitted to measurement and number it could not assume the status 
and dignity of a science. 
In turning to my final spokesman, KARL PEARSON, biometrician, 
eugenist, grammarian of science, and dedicated disciple as well as 
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biographer of GALTON, we see in a different mirror what had been 
shadowed in CLERK-MAXWELL 1 s response to FARADAY. Whereas the argu-
ments so far summarized had much in common, this spokesman of a 
generation later began where his predecessors left off. Seeking to 
stimulate thought rather than to inculcate doctrine PEARSON saw 
himself turning attention from the superstructure, that is the 
results, to the foundations of modern science, so that his argument 
was essentially criticism of concepts. Particularly did he stress 
the urgency of considering the language in which the results of 
physics were stated because that language was widely used in all 
branches of biological, including sociological, science. Physicists, 
he charged, enveloped the principles of science in obscurity and 
illogic, neither encouraging logical clearness nor forming method. 
Unlike mathematicians and historians they were entangled in the 
fetishes of pseudoscience, limited in their concepts, with no basis 
in perception beyond a statistical approximation. Their failure to 
communicate their results led directly to international anarchy and 
personal misund~rstanding. (Written in 1911 those words foreshadow 
the revolting creed : that's not my department.) 
So long as science had to carry on warfare with metaphysics 
and dogma, PEARSON continued, it had, like a skillful general, hidden 
its deficient organization, but this deficiency, which must in time 
be perceived by the enemy, would have a discouraging influence on 
scientific pursuits and on intelligent laymen. What was needed was 
logical clearness and method, characterized by classification of 
facts, recognition of their sequence, and appreciation of their rela-
tive significance, all in the interest of objective judgment. 
Repeatedly emphasizing that -science described in aonaeptuai shorthand 
the routine of peraeptuai experience, he insisted that to subsume 
developments under inelastic categories had led men to disregard the 
fundamental truths that nothing in the universe repeated itself and 
that we cannot classify by sameness only by likeness. "What is the 
cause" of something might be impossible to answer, but "to what extent 
are other phenomena associated with it" might admit of relatively easy 
solution and produce valuable knowledge. New facts might fit into the 
existing scheme, or necessitate extensive modification or even total 
rejection. However because to know required exertion,it was easiest 
to shirk effort altogether by accepting phrases which cloaked the 
unknown in the indefinable. 
Now, a few last words. Different as these men were in time, 
subject, and practice--and I might have chosen others--they shared 
one characteristic. Writing plainly within the realm of public dis-
course, usually with leisurely amplitude, they made it possible for 
the literate public with some application to understand what was 
being discovered. They used technical language only when forced to, 
for the sake of the subject itself. In informing the public of the 
merit and import of their discoveries, moreover, they informed them-
selves. They sensed and exemplified the recent insight of the poet 
AUDEN, "Language is the mother, not the handmaiden, of thought; words 
will tell you things you never thought before." For myself, I would 
say, mother as well as handmaiden, because language is clearly both. 
No matter that. What is important is that speaking, writing, 
reasoning are analytical operations, and words enable us to fix our 
minds upon the steps of analysis. Awareness of the importance--and 
limi ts--of technical terms is essential to creativity. 11 A writer 
uses abstract words because his thoughts are cloudy; the habit of 
using them clouds his thoughts still further, he may end by con-
cealing his meaning not only from his readers but from himself. 11 Yet 
often the fault of abstraatitis and ambiguity is mere clumsiness; it 
misleads the reader -only momentarily, if at al-1-, ~but makes him think 
the writer a fool for not being able to say what he means . There is 
an historical side to this, too. We are not only in bondage to today's 
lexicons, which actually belong to the day before yesterday, but we 
translate earlier concepts into our propositions and project our 
concepts into earlier propositioris."" 
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Why did the men I have sketched write as they did? Was their 
exposition, their dialogue with their readers, the fruit of their 
culture, and hence of their language? Was it the product of contro-
versy, religious, political, social, itself testimony to individualism? 
Was it evidence of the transcendent impact of FRANCIS BACON, of the 
absence of schoolmen, the dominance of amateurs? Did it owe anything 
to ceaseless mobility, geographical and social, the constant absorp-
tion of foreign brains? Was it because instead of devoting their 
energies to getting grants to apply for grants to get grants--for 
themseives--they recognized their social responsibility? Was it, 
finally, testimony to the pervasive truth of my Dickensian text, 
"advancement of knowledge and the diffusion of learning"? Well, your 
answers are as good as mine, nearly anyway. And as any professor 
knows, especially at this season of the year, it is easier to ask 
questions than to answer them. 
Dr. Charles F. Mullett 
